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SECURITIES-Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores-An Affirmation of the Birnbaum Doctrine
INTRODUCTION
The longstanding acceptance by the courts, coupled with Con-
gress' failure to reject Birnbaum's reasonable interpretation of the
wording of Section 10(b), wording which is directed towards injury
suffered "in connection with the purchase or sale" of securities,
argues significantly in favor of acceptance of the Birnbaum rule by
this Court.'
With these words the Supreme Court in Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores,2 finally determined that the private remedy for
fraud "in connection with the purchase or sale of securities" under
section 10b of the 1934 Securities and- Exchange Act 3 and rule 10b-
5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission4 is limited to a plain-
tiff class of purchasers and sellers of securities. Accordingly, the
judicially imposed Birnbaum doctrine, a product of the lower courts
since its conception in 1952, 5 need no longer battle for its continued
existence.' Nevertheless questions remain as to how the doctrine
will be applied in light of the Supreme Court opinion in Blue Chip,
1. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 95 S. Ct. 1917, 1924 (1975).
2. Id.
3. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § lob, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange -
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.
4. Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstan-
ces under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
5. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956
(1952).
6. Critics, commentators, and some courts had prematurely predicted its demise. See,
e.g., Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule 10b-5, 54 VA. L.
REV. 268 (1968); Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
Civil Liability Under lOb
and as to the effects of this decision on civil liability for securities
transactions. This article will discuss the impact of the Blue Chip
decision on 10b-5 litigation, with emphasis on the implications for
the Seventh Circuit.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Facts
A consent decree in 1967 terminated an action by the United
States against Blue Chip Stamp Co., a corporation in the business
of providing trading stamps to retailers, and nine retailers holding
90 percent of its shares.7 Pursuant to the decree, a reorganization
plan was carried out whereby "old Blue Chip" merged into Blue
Chip, a newly formed corporation. In addition, the holdings of the
majority shareholders of "old Blue Chip" were to be reduced by
offering a substantial number of their shares in the newly formed
corporation to non-shareholder users of the trading stamps on a pro-
rata basis. In an offering registered pursuant to the 1933 Securities
Act,8 a prospectus offering shares in units significantly below fair
market value was distributed to the specified stamp users. More
than 50 percent of these shares were sold, and the remaining shares
were offered to the public a year later.
Manor Drug Stores, a former user of the stamp service, brought
suit against old Blue Chip, new Blue Chip, eight majority share-
holders of old Blue Chip, and the directors of new Blue Chip (herein-
after collectively referred to as Blue Chip).' The plaintiffs claimed
that Blue Chip, lacking good faith intentions to comply with the
consent decree, prepared a prospectus that was materially mislead-
ing and overly pessimistic in order to discourage former stamp users
from accepting what was intended to be a bargain offer. Allegedly
the defendant's purpose was to later offer the rejected shares to the
public at a higher price.'" Asserting that class members failed to
purchase the bargain units in reliance on the false and misleading
prospectus, plaintiffs sought damages and the right to purchase
shares at the original offering price.
The district court dismissed plaintiffs' claims of violations of sec-
7. United States v. Blue Chip Stamp Co., 272 F. Supp. 432 (C.D. Cal. 1967), affd. sub
nom., Thrifty Shoppers Script Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 580 (1968).
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77 a-z (1970).
9. Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 339 F. Supp. 35 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
10. 95 S. Ct. 1917, 1938-39 (1975). The prospectus contained a section entitled "Items of
Special Interest" containing the allegedly false and misleading statements. A prospectus
issued a year later offering the remaining shares for sale to the public made no reference to
those same items, although they were equally relevant or irrelevant at that time.
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tion 12 of the 1933 Securities Act," section 10b of the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act and SEC rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. The
plaintiffs' claim for rights as the third party beneficiary of the con-
sent decree was also rejected.' In refusing to allow a remedy under
rule 10b-5, the court reaffirmed the Birnbaum doctrine and ex-
plained that any party who has not in fact entered into a transaction
having the effect of a purchase or sale does not come within the
provisions of that rule.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded.'" The
court held that the consent decree was the functional equivalent of
a contract and found the plaintiffs' status to be that of investors
with a contract to purchase securities. Through this rationale the
court succeeded in avoiding the Birnbaum limitation.'"
The Supreme Court Opinion
The Supreme Court reversed, and affirmed the Birnbaum doc-
trine requiring that a plaintiff be a purchaser or seller of securities
to have standing to sue under rule 10b-5.15 It was held that the
plaintiff-offerees in Blue Chip did not fall within this classification.
The Court looked to extrinsic evidence of the 1930's securities legis-
lation and concluded that Congress intended a restrictive applica-
tion of rule 10b-5. It was noted, for example, that the parallel anti-
fraud provision of the 1933 Act'" reaches fraud "in the offer or sale
of securities." Thus, by negative implication, congressional failure
to so provide under section 10b indicated a contrary intention.'7 In
11. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970).
12. Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 339 F. Supp. 35, 38 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
13. Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1973).
14. For a discussion of the aborted seller exception, see text accompanying notes 88
through 91 infra.
15. 95 S. Ct. 1917 (1975).
16. Securities Act of 1933, § 17(a), 15 U.S. C. § 77q (1970) provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the
use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate
commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly -
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or (2) to obtain money
or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (3) to engage
in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
See also Securities Act of 1933, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970); Securities and Exchange Act of
1934, § 16b, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1970).
17. 95 S. Ct. at 1924-25. The concurring opinion refers to section 5b of the 1933 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 77e(b), requiring that offers to sell registered securities be made by means of an
effective prospectus; accordingly, it was acknowledged that the Blue Chip plaintiff-offerees
were members of the limitless class of plaintiffs protected by that provision. However, it was
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the Court's opinion this textual analysis was supported by Congress'
refusal to reject the Birnbaum doctrine,'8 as well as by the long-
standing acceptance of the purchaser-seller rule throughout the
lower courts. Moreover, the Court cited provisions for express civil
liability in the 1933 and 1934 Acts,'9 and stated that the plaintiff
class for the judicially implied cause of action under 10b-5 should
not be expanded beyond those defined limits of express liability. 0
Acknowledging that any analysis of congressional intent was in-
conclusive, the Court focused heavily on policy considerations. Be-
cause the threat of extensive discovery procedures and business in-
terruptions increases settlement value in securities litigation and
provides the opportunity for nuisance suits, the Court feared the
danger of vexatious litigation which could result from the abandon-
ment of Birnbaum. In addition, there was concern that a limitless
class of plaintiffs with claims based only on oral testimony would
result in problems of proof.' The Court concluded that these policy
considerations outweigh the SEC argument" that Birnbaum is an
arbitrary restriction preventing worthy plaintiffs from recovery for
violations of 10b-5.2 3
Both the majority and concurring opinions refuted the appellate
court's holding that the antitrust decree in Blue Chip was the func-
tional equivalent of a contract between the parties and that this
"contract" satisfied the purchaser-seller requirement. Although a
party with a contractual right or duty to purchase would be deemed
a purchaser as defined by the terms of the 1934 Act, 2' the Court held
stated that this expansion of 10b-5 protection to include offers to sell, even when offerees
could demonstrate special facts as in Blue Chip, would in effect rewrite the terms of section
10b and rule lOb-5. 95 S. Ct. at 1935-36 (Powell, J., concurring).
18. In 1957 and 1959 the SEC sought from Congress an amendment to section 10b to
include "any attempt to purchase or sell any security." Neither change was adopted. S. REP.
No. 2545, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); S. REP. No. 1179, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
19. Securities Act of 1933, § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970); Securities Act of 1933, § 12, 15
U.S.C. § 771 (1970); Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1970);
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1970).
20. 95 S. Ct. at 1926.
21. But cf. Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 25-26, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 95 S. Ct. 1917 (1975). The SEC suggests alternative limitations on nonpurchaser,
nonseller plaintiffs in the absence of the Birnbaum rule.
22. SEC has regularly called for the abandonment of Birnbaum in numerous amicus
curiae briefs. See Superintendent of Ins. of New York v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404
U.S. 6 (1971); Mt. Clemens Industries v. O.M. Bell, 464 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1972); Levine v.
Seilon Inc., 439 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1971); Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1970); Pappas
v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968); Dasho v. Susquehanna, 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1967).
23. The court noted that the disadvantage of excluding worthy plaintiffs is mitigated to
the extent remedies are available under state law. See 95 S. Ct. at 1927 n.9.
24. 1934 Securities and Exchange Act, § 3a (13), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13) (1970) provides
that the terms "buy" and "purchase" each include any contract to buy, purchase, or other-
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that the Blue Chip offerees did not have a contractual relationship
under the antitrust decree and would not therefore be granted pur-
chaser status as required by Birnbaum.
Policy Considerations of the Dissent
In a dissent concurred in by Justices Douglas and Brennan, Jus-
tice Blackmun accused the Court of exhibiting "a preternatural
solicitousness for corporate well-being and a seeming callousness
toward the investing public quite out of keeping . . . with our own
traditions and the intent of the securities laws."25 The dissenting
Justices looked to legislative and administrative history of the
1930's securities legislation and rule 10b-5, focusing on the broad
general purpose to prohibit fraud in the public interest and to pro-
tect the investing public.2" Justice Blackmum interpreted "sale"
within section 10b and rule 10b-5 to refer not only to an individual-
ized trasaction, but also to a generalized public selling, including
the court-ordered special offering of securities in Blue Chip. Plain-
tiffs that could show a nexus between asserted fraud and that "sale"
of securities should not be denied a remedy merely because they
were not formal "purchasers" or "sellers." Following this reasoning
Justice Blackmun proposed abandoning the purchaser-seller limi-
tation and advocated the adoption of the general nexus test sug-
gested in Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. 7
SECTION 10B AND RULE 1OB-5
Legislative History of Section lOb
The Securities Act of 193328 and the Securities Exchange Act of
193429 were part of a broad legislative program 30 in response to the
wise acquire. 1934 Securities and Exchange Act, § 3a(14), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14) (1970)
provides that the terms "sale" and "sell" each include any contract to sell or otherwise
dispose of.
25. 95 S. Ct. at 1938.
26. For comments from the critical academia, see Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum
Doctrine: A New Era for Rule 10b-5, 54 VA. L. REV. 268 (1968); Fuller, Another Demise of
the Birnbaum Doctrine: "Tolls the Knell of Parting Day?," 25 MIAMI L. REV. 131 (1970);
Comment, Dumping Birnbaum to Force Analysis of the Standing Requirement Under Rule
lob-5, 6 LoYoL, U. CHI. L.J. 230 (1975); Comment, 10b-5 Standing Under Birnbaum: The
Case of the Missing Remedy, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 1007 (1973); Comment, The Purchaser-Seller
Requirement of Rule lOb-5 Re-evaluated, 44 CoLO. L. REV. 151 (1972).
27. 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 77a-z (1970).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78a-hh (1970).
30. Other parts of the program included: Public Utilities Holding Company Act of 1935,
15 U.S.C. § 79 et seq. (1970); Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa et seq. (1970);
Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 et seq. (1970); Investment Advisers Act
of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 et seq. (1970).
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stock market frauds of the 1920's and the great crash of 1929.1' The
1933 Act, which included a general antifraud provision,'3 2 was aimed
principally at full disclosure in the sale of new issues of securities
or distribution of outstanding securities.3 3 The 1934 Act also pro-
moted disclosure by the regulation of the exchanges themselves and
regulation of speculative practices carried on by corporate insiders.34
Much of the law of securities fraud has evolved from the general
antifraud provision on the 1934 Act, section lob. Thomas Cocoran,
a principal spokesman of the Roosevelt administration and drafter
of the Act, described section 9c, an earlier version of 10b:
Subsection(c) says "Thou shall not devise any other cunning de-
vices". . . . Of course subsection (c) is a catch-all clause to pre-
vent manipulative devices[.] I do not think there is any objection
to that kind of a clause. The Commission should have the author-
ity to deal with new manipulative devices.35
Although a number of witnesses did object to the breadth of the
section, 3 there was no indication that Congress responded to such
criticism in the enactment of section 10b.37 Courts have utilized
Cocoran's semi-official language to support the significant judicial
expansion of the law under 10b-5. 31
Despite the years of controversy over the scope of 10b-5, section
lob on which the rule was promulgated was one of the least contro-
31. See Hearings on S. Res. 84 and S. Res. 56 Before the Senate Committee on Banking
and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., & 2d Sess. (1933-34) (Pecora Investigation).
32. 1933 Securities Act, § 17a, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970).
33. S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933); H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess.
6-7 (1933). For an account of a transition of policy from preventative law to disclosure, see
Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Acts of 1933, 28 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 29
(1959).
34. S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934); H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
5, 6, 11 (1934). Although technically not part of the legislative history of the section, it should
be noted that the 1957 and 1959 legislative programs proposed amendments to 10b so that
the section would include "any attempt to purchase or sell." According to Professor Loss:
The purpose was to make it entirely clear that the section applies to the so-called
"front money racket," whereby a person obtains money from a prospective issuer
by misrepresenting his intention or ability to arrange an underwriting or financing
for the issuer, and also to place non-broker-dealers on an equal plane with broker-
dealers under Sec. 15(c)(2). . . .103 Cong. Rec. 11, 636 (1957); SEC Legislation,
Hearings before Subcom. of Senate Com. on Banking & Currency on S. 1178-82,
86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959) 367-68.
3 L. Loss, SEcurrmEs REGULATON 1424 n.6 (2d ed. 1961).
35. Hearings on Stock Exchange Regulation Before the House Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934).
36. Id. at 209.
37. 1 A. BROMBERG, SECURrTIEs LAw: FRAUD SEC RULE lOb-5 § 2.2 (1974).
38. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 859 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, sub
nom., Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
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versial sections of the 1934 Act. The committee reports and floor
debates that mention section 10b merely paraphrase the language
and give minimal insight as to congressional intent. 9 The legislative
history of section 10b is so meager that little can be drawn from it
to interpret the scope of 10b-5.1°
Promulgation of Rule 10b-5
In answer to the question "we are against fraud, aren't we?" 4' the
SEC promulgated rule 10b-5 pursuant to its authority in sections
23a and 10b of the 1934 Act.4" The purpose of the rule was to fill the
gap in the otherwise extensive antifraud provisions of the Act 43 by
prohibiting fraudulent practices by the purchasers of securities. The
general antifraud language of the rule was taken principally from
section 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act.
The initial description of 10b-5 by the SEC was brief:
39. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 18 (1934); H.R. REP. No. 1838, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess., 32-33 (1934); 78 CONG. REC. 10261 (1934); 78 CONG. REC. 8164 (1934).
40. 1 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD-SEC RULE lOb-5 § 2.2 (1974); 5 A.S. JACOBS,
SECURITIES LAW SERIES: THE IMPACT OF RULE 10b-5 § 5 (1974). See also Ruder, Civil Liability
under Rule lOb-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent?, 47 Nw. U.L. REv. 627 (1963).
Professor Ruder argues further that there is no indication that Congress even intended to
create a private remedy under lOb-5, although courts have held to the contrary.
41. The story of the casual origin of the rule is related by Milton Freeman, SEC attorney
at the time:
It was one day in the year 1943 [1942], I believe, I was sitting in my office in the
S.E.C. building in Philadelphia and I received a call from Jim Treanor who was
then the Director of the Trading and Exchange Division. He said, "I have just been
on the telephone with Paul Rowen," who was then the S.E.C. Regional Administra-
tor in Boston, "and he has told me about the president of some company in Boston
who is going around buying up the stock of his company from his own shareholders
at $4.00 a share, and he has been telling them that the company is doing very badly,
whereas, in fact, the earnings are going to be quadrupled and will be $2.00 a share
for this coming year. Is there anything we can do about it?" So he came upstairs
and I called in my secretary and I looked at Section 10(b) and I looked at [SA]
Section 17, and I put them together, and the only discussion we had there was where
"in connection with the purchase or sale" should be, and we decided it should be
at the end.
We called the Commission and we got on the calendar, and I don't remember
whether we got there that morning or after lunch. We passed a piece of paper
around to all the commissioners. All the commissioners read the rule and they
tossed it on the table, indicating approval. Nobody said anything except Sumner
Pike who said, "Well," he said, "we are against fraud, aren't we?" That is how it
happened.
Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAW. 793, 922 (1967).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (1970); 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
43. Section 17a of the 1933 Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970), prohibits fraud by any
person in the offer or sale of securities. Section 15c(1) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act,
15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (1970), prohibits fraud by brokers or dealers in the purchase or sale of
securities.
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The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced the
adoption of a rule prohibiting fraud by any person in connection
with the purchase of securities. The previously existing rules
against fraud in the purchase of securities applied only to brokers
and dealers. The new rule closes a loophole in the protections
against fraud administered by the Commission by prohibiting in-
dividuals or companies from buying securities if they engage in
fraud in their purchase."
From this uneventful origin, rule 10b-5 has become "the focal
point for spectacular growth in the law governing civil liability for
transactions in securities."45 It appears at the outset that the SEC
was concerned with its enforcement of the rule and not with private
litigation.4" Nor did the Commission anticipate the vast amount of
securities litigation that the rule has generated. Milton Freeman, an
attorney for the SEC in 1942, said in retrospect about the rule: "I
never thought that twenty-odd years later it would be the biggest
thing that had ever happened."47
Implied Civil Liability
Four years after the promulgation of the rule, the court in Kardon
v. National Gypsum Co.4" implied the existence of civil liability
under 10b-5. The shareholder-plaintiff in that case alleged that he
was induced to sell shares of stock below true value by the fraud of
the corporate-defendant. The court allowed relief under rule 10b-5,
holding that, although there was no express liability in the statute,
plaintiff was within the class for whose benefit the statute was en-
acted.
In other words, in view of the general purpose of the Act, the mere
omission of an express provision for civil liability is not sufficient
to negative what the general law implies. 9
While this interpretation has not been devoid of criticism, 0 the
44. SEC Securities Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942).
45. Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 543 (2d Cir. 1967).
46. See note 41 supra. See also 1 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD-SEC RULE 10b-
5 § 2.2 (420) (1974).
47. Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAW 793, 922
(1967).
48. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
49. Id. at 514. The general law to which the court refers is the civil tort remedy provided
in 2 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 286 (1934):
The violation of a legislative enactment by doing a prohibited act, or by failing to
do a required act, makes the actor liable for an invasion of an interest of another
if: (a) the intent of the enactment is exclusively or in part to protect an interest of
the other as an individual; and (b) the interest invaded is one which the enactment
is intended to protect.
50. See Ruder, Pitfalls in the Development of a Federal Law of Corporations by Implica-
19761
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weight of authority recognizes this private remedy as a necessary
supplement to enforcement of the rule by the SEC.5 The Supreme
Court in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life and Casualty
Co.12 needed only a footnote to approve the implied private right of
action under 10b-5, by then firmly established within the lower
courts.
BIRNBAUM AND ITS PROGENY
The Birnbaum Doctrine
This extraordinary expansion of subject-matter coverage by
§ 10(b) and rule 10b-5, coupled with the possibility of extra-
ordinarily great liability, has moved courts to limit the class of
persons who may recover to purchasers or sellers of securities. 53
The Birnbaum purchaser-seller rule is the most significant policy
developed by the judiciary to restrain the class of persons eligible
to bring civil actions under rule 10b-5. The doctrine originated in
1952 with Birmbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.54 In that case, minority
shareholders brought suit, individually and as a class, against the
controlling shareholder who had rejected an attractive merger offer
in order to sell his shares at a premium price to a third party.
Plaintiff-shareholders alleged breach of fiduciary duty and fraud in
connection with this sale of securities. The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals dismissed the claim holding, first, that rule 10b-5 provided
a cause of action for misrepresentation usually associated with the
sale or purchase of securities rather than for corporate mismanage-
ment or breach of fiduciary duty; and second, that rule 10b-5 ex-
tends protection only to a defrauded purchaser or seller. Focusing
on the articulated administrative intent of the SEC in promulgating
rule 10b-5, to extend protection from fraud to sellers as well as
purchasers of securities,55 the Birnbaum court denied relief to the
plaintiff who was neither a purchaser nor seller of securities. Al-
though the holding has been substantially expanded by allowing
tion Through Rule lOb-5, 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 185 (1964), Ruder; Civil Liability under Rule
lOb-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 627 (1963).
51. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964); see Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co.,
188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953); Hooper v.
Mountain States Securities Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270
(9th Cir. 1971).
52. 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
53. Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 877 (5th Cir. 1970).
54. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
55. Id. at 463. See text accompanying note 44 supra for the SEC Securities Act Release
No. 3230 and 6 L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 3617 (1969 Supp.) stating that Birnbaum's
version of the "legislative history" of the rule is accurate.
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claims for corporate mismanagement," the Birnbaum doctrine as a
purchaser-seller limitation has received widespread judicial sup-
port57 and has even been hailed as "the progenitor of much of the
law and conventional wisdom in the 10b-5 area.""
The Second Circuit reaffirmed Birnbaum in Iroquois Industries,
Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp.5" In that case an unsuccessful tender
offeror alleged that its take-over attempt had been defeated by de-
fendant's fraud. The court found plaintiff lacked standing to sue,
holding that the alleged fraud went to plaintiff's failure to purchase
stock and plaintiff was therefore not a purchaser of securities as
required under rule 10b-5. The court explained: (1) the purpose of
rule 10b-5 was to provide a remedy to sellers as well as buyers of
securities; (2) the Birnbaum doctrine had not been relaxed through
subsequent decisions; and (3) if the purchaser-seller limitation on
standing were to be abandoned, it would be up to Congress to do
SO.
60
Illustrative of further judicial construction of Birnbaum is the
Ninth Circuit opinion in Mount Clemens Industries, Inc. v. Bell.6'
Plaintiffs in that case argued not only that Birnbaum had been so
eroded that it was no longer the law, but also that it had been
incorrectly decided and should be disavowed, a theory espoused by
the SEC as amicus curiae. The Ninth Circuit rejected both argu-
ments:
56. See Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
In that case, the Court allowed a cause of action for corporate mismanagement so long as
the fraud touched loosely on the purchase or sale of securities. Any question whether the
purchaser-seller requirement was also eliminated by that opinion has been settled by the
Supreme Court opinion in Blue Chip.
57. See Haberman v. Murchison, 468 F.2d 1305 (2d Cir. 1972) (derivative action against
corporate officers who withheld material inside information in selling stock to a third party;
the court, following Birnbaum, did not grant standing); Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139 (3rd
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974) (derivative and shareholder actions against a
bank president who had used assets of the bank in personal speculative investments; the
claim was dismissed under Birnbaum); City National Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221 (8th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970) (counterclaim by corporate shareholders based
upon misrepresentations made to their corporation; the counterclaim was dismissed following
Birnbaum); Simmons v. Wolfson, 428 F.2d 455 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 999
(1971) (class suit by holders of stock alleging impairment in value of their stock through
manipulation; dismissal of the claim was affirmed pursuant to Birnbaum); Sargent v. Ge-
nesco, 492 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1974) (direct and derivative action by stockholders alleging
nondisclosure of material information concerning a refinancing plan resulting in dilution of
stocks' value; the court held plaintiff had no standing because not a purchaser or seller in
refinancing plan).
58. Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722, 730 n.41 (2d Cir. 1972).
59. 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970). But cf. Crane Co. v.
Westinghouse Airbrake, 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970).
60. See Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962).
61. 464 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1972).
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When examined quite carefully, however, there has been no ero-
sion of Birnbaum. Rather, the doctrine formulated therein has
been interpreted and applied flexibly, not technically and restric-
tively . . . thus promoting the congressional purpose in the enact-
ment of this remedial legislation.2
In affirming the doctrine, the Mount Clemens court rejected the
Birnbaum court's reliance on administrative intent in the promul-
gation of rule 10b-5. 3 The Ninth Circuit preferred the historical and
constitutional approach to the doctrine, as articulated in Herpich
v. Wallace,64 an earlier Fifth Circuit decision.' 5
Without accounting for variant judicial construction of the
purchaser-seller rule, the Supreme Court supported its own affirma-
tion of the Birnbaum doctrine by such lower court holdings:6
As with Kardon, virtually all lower federal courts facing the issue
in the hundreds of reported cases presenting this question over the
past quarter century have reaffirmed Birnbaum's conclusion that
the plaintiff class for purposes of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 private
damage action is limited to purchasers or sellers of securities.67
Birnbaum as a Standing Requirement
Although standing was never mentioned in the original opinion,
the Birnbaum doctrine has developed into a standing requirement
that has been considered of constitutional dimensions." The Fifth
Circuit in Herpich discussed the purchaser-seller limitation in rela-
tion to the two-pronged standing test set out by the Supreme Court
in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v.
Camp. 9 The first part of the test is predicated on the case or contro-
versy requirement of article III of the Constitution:70 the plaintiff
62. Id. at 341.
63. Id. at 342 n.6.
64. 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970).
65. It must be noted that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals deemed the plaintiff-offeree
in Blue Chip a statutory purchaser pursuant to an antitrust decree, fulfilling this articulated
standing requirement.
66. The Court analogized the acceptance of Birnbaum with the overwhelming judicial
affirmation afforded the implied private remedy under rule 10b-5; but see note 50 supra.
67. 95 S. Ct. at 1923. This comment is of particular note to the Seventh Circuit which, in
Eason, had abandoned the Birnbaum doctrine.
68. See Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970); Mount Clemens Industries, Inc.
v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1972).
69. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
70. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made or which shall be
made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to
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must allege an injury in fact, economic or otherwise, has been
caused by defendant's conduct. The second part of the test requires
that the interest sought to be protected by the plaintiff is "arguably
within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the
statute or constitutional guarantee in question."'" The Herpich
court construed the "in connection with language" of section 10b as
demonstrating congressional intent to provide open and unmanipu-
lated markets in which investors could make knowing decisions re-
garding purchases and sales of securities. Accordingly, any loss in
connection with these purchases or sales is the type of injury prohib-
ited under section lOb and rule 10b-5.72 Deviating from that inter-
pretation of broad congressional intent, the court drastically nar-
rowed their focus to conclude that only purchasers or sellers could
demonstrate "an invasion of their own federally protected interest
to engage in securities transactions while free from the effects of
deceptive or unfair practices employed in connection therewith, not
merely a wrong done to someone else."" Therefore, it was held that
only a purchaser or seller meets the requirements of Data Processing
for standing to sue under rule 10b-5. However, this finding was
tempered by the court's approval of exceptions to Birnbaum,
whereby parties not technically purchasers or sellers may be deemed
such and afforded the protection of the rule.
Exceptions to Birnbaum
While courts have espoused the Birmbaum requirement, many
exceptions to the purchaser-seller limitation have become a recog-
nized part of 10b-5 litigation. These confusing and sometimes incon-
sistent results led some commentators and courts to suggest that the
requirement itself had been abandoned." Although Birnbaum has
been affirmed in Blue Chip, courts may continue to recognize these
exceptions articulated as a flexible construction of rule 10b-5 in
order to "effectuate its remedial purposes."75
The most clearly defined of these exceptions is an action for in-
junctive relief as opposed to damages. In Mutual Shares Corp. v.
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies be-
tween two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;- Citi-
zens of different States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under
Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign
States, Citizens or Subjects.
71. 397 U.S. at 153.
72. See Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 806 (5th Cir. 1970).
73. Id.
74. See note 6 supra.
75. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963).
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Genesco, Inc.," plaintiffs alleged that, after they had purchased
stock in S. H. Kress Co., defendant Genesco and its chairman ma-
nipulated the market price of the Kress stock and decreased stock
dividends in order to force minority stockholders to sell out at a
depressed price. Damages were denied, but the court allowed in-
junctive relief to halt the continuing manipulative scheme. Noting
that such claims avoid the issue of proof of loss and casual connec-
tion, the court did not require the plaintiff to assert purchaser-seller
status.7
The "forced" seller or purchaser situation is another recognized
exception to Birnbaum. In A. T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow,75 a broker-
dealer suffered a loss as a direct result of a customer's fraud in
ordering stocks with the intent of paying only if the value increased.
That court granted the broker-plaintiff the unusual status of
"forced purchaser" and allowed standing to sue.
The "forced seller" doctrine is more common. It is typified in Vine
v. Beneficial Finance Co.7" where the court held a minority stock-
holder of a corporation to be a "seller" when the corporation was
merged in a short-form merger. The holding was based on the fact
that, although the shareholder still retained stocks of the non-
existent corporation, he would be forced to convert them into cash
at the price fixed either by the merger or under the statutory ap-
praisal procedure. The doctrine has also been applied to executory
mergers' and liquidation proceedings." The Supreme Court has
looked with approval at this expanded concept of purchase or sale:
Whatever the terms "purchase" and "sale" may mean in other
contexts, here an alleged deception has affected individual share-
holders' decisions in a way not at all unlike that involved in a
typical cash sale or share exchange 82
At the outer limits of the "forced seller" exception are some "hy-
76. 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
77. As Justice Goldberg explained in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau: "It is not
necessary in a suit for equitable or prophylactic relief to establish all the elements in a suit
for monetary damages." 375 U.S. at 193. The majority in Blue Chip also noted this distinc-
tion. 95 S. Ct. at 1933 n.14. For additional cases allowing the injunctive relief exception, see
Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, sub nom., Glen Alda Corp. v.
Kahan, 398 U.S. 950 (1970). But cf. Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783 (8th Cir.
1967). Jachiemiec v. Schenley Industries, Inc., Case No. 15,027 (7th Cir. Feb. 26, 1965).
78. 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967).
79. 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
80. Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970).
81. Coffee v. Permian Corp., 434 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1970). But cf. Greenstein v. Paul, 400
F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1968). An attempted merger was not considered a forced sale since plaintiff
still had selling alternatives.
82. SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 467 (1969).
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brid" cases which courts have brought under the protective um-
brella of 10b-5. in Travis v. Imperial Limited,83 defendants bought
90 percent of the shares of a corporation, but through alleged fraud-
ulent means induced the remaining ten percent of the shareholders
not to tender. When there was no longer an open market for the
stock, plaintiffs had no choice but to sell at the artificially low rates.
The court held that the sale, though delayed, constituted a forced
sale since defendant's fraud had so limited the market that plaintiff
was forced in a practical sense to dispose of the stock.84
The "forced seller" doctrine was also applied in Crane Co. v.
Westinghouse Air Brake Co. 5 In that case, Crane's unsuccessful
tender offer was defeated as a result of defendant's fraudulent mar-
ket manipulations. The court did grant the frustrated tenderer
standing to sue as a forced seller under 10b-5, but only because that
plaintiff was later forced to dispose of his stocks as a result of a
threatened antitrust action. It must be noted that the Second Cir-
cuit denied standing to sue under rule 10b-5 in a comparable factual
situation. In Iroquois Industries, Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp. , the
court held that the unsuccessful tenderer had not been defrauded
in purchasing stocks but only in being precluded from purchasing
and the action was not permitted. The only distinction between the
two cases was that the Crane court relied upon the subsequent
disposal of securities in order to find the plaintiff within the "forced
seller" exception to Birnbaum.
The "aborted seller" exception is another means of achieving
standing under rule 10b-5. Cases in this category are based on the
principle that once a party enters a contractual agreement the sta-
tus of purchaser or seller, as defined by the 1934 Act, is obtained.
For example, a proposed reorganization plan resulted in a 10b-5
action when the exchange of stock was never completed. The Ninth
Circuit held that because sufficient contractual relations had been
interrupted, the plaintiff had standing to sue as an aborted seller."
The contractual requirements for the exception were also considered
83. 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973).
84. Travis has also been classified within the delayed seller exception. See also Stockwell
v. Reynolds, 252 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). In that case, plaintiff alleged that broker-
dealer induced him by misrepresentations to retain his stocks. When plaintiff sold the stocks
at a loss five months later, the court allowed relief, holding that the purchase or sale does
not have to follow immediately the alleged fraud.
85. 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970).
86. 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969).
87. See note 24 supra.
88. Walling v. Beverly Enterprises, 476 F.2d 393 (9th Cir. 1973); cf. Ashton v. Thornley
Realty Co., 346 F. Supp. 1294 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 471 F.2d 647 (2d Cir. 1973).
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adequate in Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co. 9 The defendant-
stockbroker misrepresented to the plaintiff-client that purchases
and sales of securities were being made. The district court found
that Birnbaum did not apply since these plaintiffs were parties to
the securities transactions and would have been actual purchasers
or sellers but for defendant's fraud. The court granted relief, reason-
ing that rule 10b-5 was clearly intended to prohibit this kind of
transaction.
When damages are easily determinable and plaintiff's failure to
act is directly caused by defendant's fraud, aborted seller status has
been granted.9" In Neuman v. Electronic Speciality Co.,9' defen-
dants had misled plaintiffs into believing that a telegraphic accept-
ance of a tender offer would be honored. Because plaintiffs could
show that they would have sold their stock but for defendants'
fraud, the court found the required causal connection between de-
fendants' fraud and the aborted sale. This case has broader implica-
tions than other cases within this exception which rely on contrac-
tual relations as the statutory equivalent to purchase or sale. By
employing a causation analysis, the Seventh Circuit in Neuman
expanded the boundaries of the "aborted seller" exception other-
wise determined by the existence of these contractual connections.
Subsequent to Birnbaum, courts have also recognized the "con-
structive" purchaser or seller exception. In these cases, plaintiffs are
brought within the confines of the rule through a functional equiva-
lent analysis as employed by the Sixth Circuit in James v. Gerber
Products Co.9" The court held that the plaintiff as beneficiary of a
trust from which securities were sold directly to defendant-
corporation had standing to sue under rule 10b-5. The plaintiff was
found to have constructive seller status because he was the real
party in interest or the functional equivalent of the seller of securi-
ties.93
89. 265 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
90. One commentator has denominated this as the causation exception. See Jacobs,
Birnbaum in Flux: Significant 10b-5 Developments, 2 SECURITIES L.J. 305, 310 (1975); see also
5 A. S. JACOBS, SECURITIES LAW SERIES: THE IMPACT OF RuLE 10B-5 § 38 (1974); Kellogg, The
Inability to Obtain Analytical Precision Where Standing to Sue Under Rule lOb-5 is Involved,
20 BUFFALO L. REV. 93, 115 (1970).
91. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,591 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
92. 483 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1973).
93. See Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1972) (beneficial shareholders in
debenture redemption plan); Bailes v. Colonial Press, Inc., 444 F.2d 1241 (5th Cir. 1971)
(trustee in bankruptcy); Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960)
(issuer of stock); International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 932 (1974) (disposal of stock portfolio by dividends).
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SCOPE OF 1OB-5 AFTER BLUE CHIP
Based on policy considerations directed at protection of the busi-
ness community, the Supreme Court has affirmed the Birnbaum
purchaser-seller limitation on standing to sue under rule 10b-5. It
is the tradition of 10b-5 litigation for the Court, lacking the benefit
of legislative history, to balance the commercial welfare with that
of the individual in deciding cases brought under the rule. As the
court in Herpich explained:
Protection for investors is a primary importance but it must be
kept in mind that the nation's welfare depends upon the mainte-
nance of a viable, vigorous business community. 5
Relying on this theory, the Court in Blue Chip determined that
Birnbaum could not be abandoned for fear of encouraging vexatious
litigation and forced settlements under rule 10b-5. The restrictive
policy appeared to have two goals: the first was to limit liability to
an ascertainable class of plaintiffs; the second, which can be in-
ferred, was to prevent claims for corporate mismanagement pres-
ently allowable only in state court from reaching the federal forum.
Dismissing the viability of alternate methods of achieving these
goals for limiting liability, the Court simply concluded that
Birnbaum continues to be the most effective judicial restriction on
the private remedy for fraud. 6
An essential consideration of the Blue Chip mandate is its effect
on the vast body of case law litigated under rule 10b-5. With the
exclusion of the Seventh Circuit's recent disavowal in Eason of the
doctrine, courts have generally paid homage to the purchaser-seller
rule. Nevertheless, judicial construction has been so varied between
and within circuits that the expansive Birnbaum decisions have
come to include not only the doctrine, but also its many judicially-
created exceptions. 7 There can only be speculation as to the future
94. See Hearings on H.R. 4314 Before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1933). As discussed by Huston Thompson, one of the
principal drafters of the 1933 act:
The purpose and policy here is to protect, first of all, the purchasers of securities,
and second, honest business houses that are selling securities, with as little interfer-
ence with business as possible.
95. 430 F.2d at 804.
96. But see Comment, 10b-5 Standing Under Birnbaum: The Case of the Missing
Remedy, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 1007, 1030 (1973). The commentator suggests Birnbaum is a
haphazard means of denying sham lawsuits, and that deterrence by means of FED. R. Civ. P.
11 and 23.1 would be more effective. See also Jacobs, Birnbaum in Flux: Significant lOb-5
Developments, 2 SEC. REG. L.J. 305, 325-29 (1975).
97. For a discussion of the exceptions to Birnbaum, see text accompanying notes 74
through 93 supra.
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of such judicial interpretation because the Supreme Court did not
specifically address this issue.
The Court did carefully distinguish the Blue Chip plaintiff-
offerees as a potentially broader class than parties who had been
granted purchaser-seller status through recognized judicially-
created exceptions:
Even if we were to accept the notion that the Birnbaum rule could
be circumvented on a case-by-case basis through particularized
judicial inquiry into the facts surrounding a complaint, this res-
pondent and the members of his alleged class would be unlikely
candidates for such a judicially created exception. While the
Birnbaum rule has been flexibly interpreted by lower federal
courts, we have been unable to locate a single decided case from
any court in the 20-odd years of litigation since the Birnbaum
decision which would support the right of persons who were in the
position of respondent here to bring a private suit under Rule 10b-
5. Respondent was not only not a buyer or seller of any security
but it was not even a shareholder of the corporate petitioners.98
The negative implication drawn from this distinction and from the
Court's failure to nullify the Birnbaum exceptions is that prior case
law has not been overruled. It is likely that those lower courts follow-
ing a liberal precedent will focus on this vague language to continue
their independent construction of the doctrine with broad excep-
tions. However, courts that have preferred a narrower construction
of the doctrine may follow Blue Chip more restrictively in delineat-
ing the status of purchaser or seller. As a result, much of the chaos
and unpredictability surrounding civil liability under 10b-5 has not
been eliminated.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in Blue Chip has provided the
outer boundaries for this ill-defined area. Birnbaum has been firmly
established as the law; the purchaser-seller criteria are essential to
the standing test under 10b-5. Moreover, the Blue Chip opinion
stands as a major policy statement halting further expansion of the
plaintiff class under the rule.
Unfortunately, the Court left unanswered the most perplexing
and difficult question arising from its acceptance of Birnbaum:
whether the adoption of the purchaser-seller rule as a limiting doc-
trine is consistent with the standing requirement set out by the
Court in Data Processing.9 That test provides that a complainant
may be afforded a remedy to sue if the party has suffered an injury
98. 95 S. Ct. at 1933 (footnote omitted).
99. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
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in fact and that injury is arguably within the zone of interests sought
to be protected under the statute. Certainly such a determination
of standing under section 10b and rule 10b-5 is particularly complex
due to the vague statutory language, lack of administrative and
legislative history, overlapping regulatory provisions, and conflict-
ing judicial construction. Several appellate courts have analytically
confronted the problem, attempting to clarify the plaintiff class
legitimately deserving a remedy for fraud "in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities."'100
The Supreme Court in Blue Chip ignored the problem. The opin-
ion stated that plaintiffs deserving a remedy under rule 10b-5, im-
pliedly as required by the Data Processing test, would arbitrarily be
denied standing under the Birnbaum restriction. The Court ex-
plained that such a result is justified by the policy considerations
underlying the enforcement of Birnbaum.'0 1 This reasoning brought
forth legitimate criticism from the dissent:
We should be wary about heeding the seductive call of expediency
and about substituting convenience and ease of processing for the
more difficult task of separating the genuine claim from the un-
founded one. 02
A blatant example of the controversy left unresolved by Blue Chip
is reflected in the dichotomy between the Crane and Iroquois cases.
In comparable factual situations, each plaintiff alleged the same
injury by a defendant in the same manner, but only one plaintiff
was granted standing to sue under rule 10b-5. That plaintiff, Crane,
was allowed a federal forum because of a later sale of securities due
to a threatened antitrust action unrelated to the defendant's alleged
fraud. In Crane the Second Circuit, creator and adherent of
Birnbaum, employed a fictitious distinction to avoid the purchaser-
seller limitation on standing. It appears that the restrictive policy
application of the Birnbaum doctrine, now mandated by the Su-
preme Court in Blue Chip, propagates such contradictions and con-
tinued confusion regarding civil liability under rule 10b-5.
IMPACT OF BLUE CHIP ON SEVENTH CIRCUIT LAW
Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.
In 1973 the Seventh Circuit in Eason v. General Motors Accept-
100. Compare Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973)
with Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970).
101. For a discussion of the Supreme Court opinion, see text accompanying notes 15
through 24 supra.
102. 95 S. Ct. at 1941-42.
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ance Corp. 03 abolished the Birnbaum limitation on standing to sue
under rule 10b-5. In that case, defendant Bank Service Corporation
(Bank Service) had purchased the leasing division of Dave Waite
Pontiac, Inc. (Waite) and had issued in return 7,000 shares of its
own stock to Waite, assuming the liabilities of Waite Leasing in-
cluding notes payable to General Motors Acceptance Corporation
(GMAC). The plaintiff-shareholders of Bank Service had also per-
sonally guaranteed those notes and any future obligations. After the
leasing business became insolvent and Bank Service defaulted,
GMAC brought suit against the plaintiff-shareholders in the state
court to recover on the guarantees. Plaintiffs counterclaimed, bring-
ing an action in the federal court under 10b-5 alleging fraudulent
misrepresentations and omissions in connection with the purchase
or sale of securities.
After the district court dismissed the action for lack of standing
under Birnbaum, the appellate court reversed and remanded stat-
ing that rule 10b-5 protected investors who "suffer significant injury
as a direct consequence of fraud in connection with a securities
transaction, even though their participation in the transaction did
not involve either the purchase or sale of a security."'' 4 The court,
although seeming to formulate a new test, carefully pointed out that
it was not trying to develop "a succinct substitute" for Birnbaum.' 5
The Seventh Circuit preferred to define the appropriate limits of
relief through case-by-case adjudication using a causal-nexus analy-
sis.
The opinion acknowledged that 10b-5 litigation had expanded
significantly in recent history and would continue to do so. The
court minimized the possibility of a dramatic increase in litigation
if Birnbaum were abandoned, but stated that the SEC had the
power and expertise to curtail any such increase by appropriate
amendments. In any event, the court refused to rely on this consid-
eration to qualify the imposition of what they believed to be "an
artificial restriction inconsistent with the intent of the underlying
statute."106
In holding that Birnbaum was no longer the law in the Seventh
Circuit, the Eason court extended 10b-5 protection to investors who
could demonstrate a direct causal connection between their injury
and the alleged fraud of the defendant. More specific guidelines as
to the definition of "direct causation," "investors" and "special
103. Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973).
104. Id. at 659.
105. Id. at 660 n.29.
106. Id. at 661.
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class" were left to future judicial construction. Although boldly ar-
ticulated, it is questionable whether this approach varied signifi-
cantly from pre-Eason law in the Seventh Circuit or other circuits
following a liberal interpretation of the Birnbaum doctrine.
Pre-Eason Decisions
In the history of securities law in the Seventh Circuit, it is not
certain whether Birnbaum was ever adopted or was adopted but
liberally construed."7 Most decisions involving plaintiffs who were
not technically purchasers or sellers, often categorized as Birnbaum
exceptions, seem to have been analyzed on a functional equivalent
basis or the causation approach, ultimately articulated by the
Eason court.
Prior to Eason, the case of Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp.08 had
been frequently cited for the proposition that Birnbaum was the law
in this circuit, sanctioning by implication the forced purchaser-
seller exception.0 9 In Dasho, the Seventh Circuit allowed a deriva-
tive action by shareholders of a surviving corporation which had
been fraudulently induced to sell its stock to another corporation at
excessive prices, resulting in financial gain to the corporate officers.
The issuance of stock was to be followed by a merger into the pur-
chaser corporation, whereby the surviving corporation was to as-
sume the excessive financial obligations of the original sale. The
court determined that "when the merger was approved and the
exchange of securities occurred, the owner of the stock had in effect
purchased a new security and paid for it by turning in his old
one."" 0 The plaintiffs were therefore deemed either purchasers or
sellers of securities entitled to the protection of rule 10b-5. Explain-
ing that a flexible interpretation of sale and purchase was in keeping
with the purposes of securities legislation, the court considered the
merger the equivalent of a cash sale of corporate stocks for purposes
of the rule.
Other Seventh Circuit decisions have advanced this line of rea-
soning in holding that a "fraudulent substitution of shareholder
status in one company for the same status in another" is a cogniza-
ble injury under section 10b and rule 10b-5, whether or not the
transaction is actually characterized as a forced purchase or sale."'
107. Comment, Seventh Circuit Repudiates the Birnbaum Doctrine, 3 U. ILL. L. FoR. 521,
527 & n.35 (1974).
108. 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, sub nom., Bard v. Dasho, 389 U.S. 977 (1967).
109. But cf. 490 F.2d at 661 n.30. The Eason court claimed that Dasho merely explained
why the Birnbaum limitation would not defeat plaintiffs action.
110. 380 F.2d at 267.
111. Boggess v. Hogan, 328 F. Supp. 1048, 1052 (N.D. Ill. 1971), quoting Swanson v.
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Decisions of the Seventh Circuit have also been categorized
within the "aborted seller" exception. 112 In Goodman v. H. Hentz
& Co.,"1 the plaintiff was granted purchaser status on the basis of
the interruption of contractual relations by defendant's fraud. The
plaintiff in Neuman v. Electronic Speciality Co. "4 was granted relief
under rule 10b-5, by proving a direct causal connection between
defendant's fraud and plaintiff's aborted sale, and also by proving
easily determinable damages."' The court employed a causation
analysis to determine that plaintiffs would have been actual sellers
but for defendant's fraud and granted seller status for purposes of
the rule.
Implications for the Future
In viewing the case law of the Seventh Circuit, it does not appear
that the protection of rule 10b-5 has been extended noticeably be-
yond that provided in other circuits."6 As acknowledged by the Su-
preme Court, liability under the rule has never been extended so far
as to afford relief to a party in the position of the plaintiff-offeree
in Blue Chip. In the future, the Seventh Circuit will have to show
deference to the Birnbaum doctrine as mandated by Blue Chip, but
may well continue to employ the causation approach substantively
in accord with prior Seventh Circuit holdings.
The facts of Eason provide a framework in which to discuss this
hypothesis. Pursuant to Birnbaum, the court might have ap-
proached the same factual situation by bringing the plaintiff within
the status of constructive purchaser-seller. Just as the beneficiary
in James v. Gerber Products Co. "' was allowed standing to sue as
the real party in interest, the plaintiff in Eason might also have been
allowed this status. The Eason plaintiff was the real party in inter-
est since he, and not the corporation, had suffered injury from the
securities transaction entered into by the corporation."' Following
American Consumer Industries, Inc., 415 F.2d 1326, 1332 (7th Cir. 1969).
112. For a discussion of the aborted seller exception, see text accompanying notes 87
through 91 supra.
113. See text accompanying note 89 supra.
114. See text accompanying note 91 supra.
115. The Neuman court distinguishes Jachiemiec v. Schenley Industries, Inc., Case No.
15,027 (7th Cir. Feb. 26, 1965) where a plaintiff was barred from injunctive relief by the rule.
116. During the short time that Eason was controlling, there was no departure from
precedent in factual analysis. See, e.g., C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G & G Enterprises, Inc.,
508 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir. 1975) where the court paid homage to the Eason test but was not
dealing with the issue of purchaser-seller status under 10b-5.
117. 483 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1973).
118. See Comment, Dumping Birnbaum to Force Analysis of the Standing Requirement
Under Rule lOb-5, 6 LoYoLA U. Cm. L.J. 230, 245-246 (1975).
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this analysis the Eason court might have invoked an exception to
Birnbaum to provide that plaintiff a federal forum. Hopefully the
Seventh Circuit will continue its former enlightened approach,
legitimized under the name of Birnbaum and its exceptions. If this
occurs, established precedent will not be drastically affected by
the Blue Chip requirement.
The significant implications of the Blue Chip decision go to the
future of securities law in the Seventh Circuit. In disavowing
Birnbaum, the Eason court was attempting to grapple with the
difficult issue of standing under rule 10b-5. Through case-by-case
adjudication employing the causation approach, the court had
sought to effect the definition of the legitimate plaintiff class to be
afforded a remedy under the rule even at risk of extending liability
to a broader class of deserving complainants, including claims for
corporate mismanagement." 9 The ultimate goal appeared to be the
evolution of a predictable standing requirement for 10b-5.
However, following the Supreme Court's mandate, the Seventh
Circuit must quanitatively restrict standing to sue under 10b-5, and
some plaintiffs who might have brought valid claims for fraud in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities under the Eason
causal-nexus approach will be denied a federal forum. Furthermore,
the Seventh Circuit must couch its opinions in the language of the
purchaser-seller rule, and the fictions propagated therein. As a re-
sult, the judicial reform anticipated for securities litigation by the
Eason court has been nullified.
CONCLUSION
The application of rule 10b-5 has been a confusing combination
of congressional history, administrative intent, and judicial inter-
pretation. The rule no longer means what it says,2 0 and the area
needed clarification and reform. Many commentators and the
Seventh Circuit looked to the Supreme Court with that hope. But
the Court in Blue Chip, by simply affirming Birnbaum as a limiting
doctrine, has made it clear that there will be no judicial reform of
the law under 10b-5. If there is to be a systematic and predictable
scheme of securities regulation, it must be legislatively initiated.
119. See Jacobs, Birnbaum in Flux: Significant lOb-5 Developments, 2 SEC. REG. L.J. 305,
325-329 (1975). The commentator discusses the Seventh Circuit's solution for the most serious
objection to its former position: the question of the motion to dismiss. Mr. -Jacobs suggests
that, in response to a motion to dismiss, the causal nexus was a rebuttable presumption not
sufficiently direct without a showing of special facts (such as the affirmative action to trade
in Neuman or the guaranteed notes in Eason).
120. 3 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD - SEC RuLE lob-5 § 12.9 at 283 (1974).
19761
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Unless Congress is willing to take such a step, "bloody, but un-
bowed Birnbaum still stands.' ' 2
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121. Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 877 (5th Cir. 1970).
